Is AFP losing? A general talks
GOTCHA By Jarius Bondoc
Friday, August 24, 2007
Raul Gonzalez’s “tit for tat” with Sen. Ping Lacson is nothing but hot air. For him to pin crime on Lacson at this time, after the latter’s revival of the discomfiting “Garci issue” against Gonzalez’s boss, smacks of malicious prosecuting. It only lays bare Gonzalez’s transactional law enforcement. So expect nothing to come out of his threat to indict Lacson based on papers used to convict Michael Ray Aquino in America for espionage.
Gonzalez is noted to use his powers not for the nation but his boss. If a military officer plots to topple her, Gonzalez will rustle up a case of coup d’état in no time. If the officer softens and opts to just hide, Gonzalez with the same speed will devise a way to weaken his own case.
Gonzalez will cripple even the state for someone’s sake. Proof is his implicit favoring last Dec. of Fraport’s $425-million collection from RP. The state was then arguing in the US that Fraport shouldn’t be rewarded since it broke the Anti-Dummy Law in the NAIA-3 deal. In Manila, Gonzalez was dismissing solid evidence of dummying against Fraport and Piatco officers. It was as if he wanted the state to pay the $425 million, although Fraport already had written off half of it. To whom would that half have gone — since no longer defensible for Fraport to accept — had it been paid out?
Gonzalez barks that, since convict Aquino was Lacson’s right-hand man for a long time, he’d nail Lacson for something or another from tapes sent by US prosecutors. In the same breath, he slips that subalterns are still transcribing the ten tapes, so he doesn’t know if there’s proof to link Lacson to crime. In the end he says he’ll at least have the transcripts published to publicly embarrass Lacson — as if the policeman-politico isn’t used to such.
Then again, in bragging about his supposed anti-Lacson transcripts, would any self-respecting newspaper report on it now that Gonzalez has announced his malicious intention? He’d have to take out an ad — yet even that too could be questioned in court. That’s the problem with transactional law enforcement. It makes one forget to think.
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The Armed Forces has lost 56 fighting men in rapid sequence. On July 10th 14 Marines, including an officer, perished in an ambush by Moro separatists in Basilan. A month later 26 Army infantrymen died in two ambushes by Islamist terrorists on the same day in the same town in Sulu. Back in Basilan last weekend 15 more Marines, five lieutenants among them, fell battling to capture a terrorist camp. Nearby a reconnoitering Air Force chopper crashed, killing the pilot. The question in everyone’s mind is: Is the AFP losing?
In a paper for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, retired Army lieutenant-general Romeo Dominguez gives the answer: “The enemy has not become a better fighter; our fighting capability has deteriorated.” The former head of AFP units in West Mindanao, Samar-Leyte and North Luzon focuses on three issues (excerpted here for space):
“Poor leadership. The soldiers seemed lost on the ground, with neither a single commander orchestrating their actions nor any operational center monitoring them... No real action on the ground was unleashed to pursue the enemy. Soldiers could have proceeded without delay, without the writs to pursue the fleeing bandits — and might have surprised the Albarka bandits who, according to reports, had gathered for a victory feast not far from the scene of the crime... A commander should spend time reinforcing his unit’s team spirit and competence through sports and record firing; unit maneuvers, field tests, combat rehearsals and review of combat SOPs; and discussion of enemy tactics.
“Insufficient training. In each case, the entire movements, the mode used, and individual demeanor reflected an organization that has forgotten its training lessons. But looking at our shrinking military camps, what kind of unit training can really be done in them? Training environments should hew closely to battlefield situations; sadly no AFP camp today has the right space to offer this . . . Are units trained and equipped to fight and win the kind of battle the enemy is waging? Are personnel in combat-support and service units trained to believe in their hearts that their collective reason for being is to ensure the survival and efficiency of the man in the frontline, and thus accordingly trained in their respective expertise? How come the choppers in Basilan could not fly allegedly because no aviation fuel was available?
“Inadequate logistics. Radio compatibility has been a nagging problem for two years. Ground commanders had to put their own radiomen and equipment onboard choppers to ensure better communications between pilots and soldiers on the ground. Interoperability it seems has yet to sink into the consciousness of our logistics commands. As for dud ammunition, there’s an SOP for checks before jump-off in every operation — on top of tests made upon receipt of delivery . . . Not too long ago a massive fraud in the procurement of 105-mm Howitzer artillery rounds was uncovered. No one was punished for the crime. Higher headquarters’ priority in allocating resources needs review. There should be strong emphasis on combat effectiveness of line units rather than sprucing up of major camps in Metro Manila as show window. Fill-up of combat units according to Table of Organization and Equipment should never be sacrificed nor delayed for purposes of savings. How many times have we heard of battalion commanders complaining of how their units are undermanned and ill-equipped, while at the end of the fiscal year GHQ and major service command headquarters ask around for ‘special projects’ to generously fund out of ‘savings’ from operations and personnel services?”
http://www.philstar.com/index.php?Opinion&p=49&type=2&sec=25&aid=20070823216
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