Special Operations Teams (SOT)

[Adroth]

The first time I heard about SOTs, ironically, was through red propaganda denouncing their formation. Apparently the AFP was on to something when this came about . . . because the reds were genuinely worried about these units.

Lets study them here.

This is an excerpt from Victor Corpus' Silent War (which is also discussed here: http://timawa.net/forum/index.php?topic=9457.0

Special Operations Teams

SOT is a concept originated by Capt Alex B. Congmon of the Philippine Army, designed to dismantle the CPP/NPA political structure in one enemy guerilla front. It was first successfully implemented by the 53rd Infantry Battalion under Col. Cesar F. Ilano in Misamis Oriental and later on adapted and propagated by other units of the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Brig. Gen Mariano P Adalem.

The concept is based on the selected application of significant experience of tactical units in the field. It is noticed that in previous military undertakings against the communist insurgents, the emphasis lay on the elimination of the armed elements, with body counts serving as the gauge for success. On the other hand, the enemy political structures in the barangays remain practically untouched and intact, the destruction of the enemy political structure is not given due attention. But these political structures in the barangays are what the enemy uses to mobilize the people in support of the insurgent's cause, as a result of which the insurgents are provided a rich source of manpower, supplies, shelter, food, guides, communication, early warning, and excellent combat intelligence.

It is a well known fact that guerrillas are like fish in water. Unless we demolish their political structures in the barangay, miiary operations will only be exercises in futility. To catch the fish, we must first drain the water from the pond. In like manner, in order to effectively defeat the armed elements, we must first demolish the enemy's political structures in the barangays within the guerrilla front.

The SOT concept outlines seven (7) phases in the process of "draining the water" from the pond:

Phase I - Organization and Training

The recommended SOT organization is composed of psyops, security and stay-behind teams. The psyops team is composed of a team leader, assistant team leader, propagandists, interrogators, order of battle (OB) specialists, and a recorder/photographer.

• The team leader controls and supervises the team.
• The assistant team leader takes charge of administrative matters.
• The propagandists are responsible for disseminating propaganda.
• The interrogators are in charge of interrogation of POWs and surrenderees.
• The OB specialist determines the enemy political structures in the target barangay and the personalities involved.
• The photographer/recorder records the events.

The number of psyops team varies; the more propagandists, the better. Experience in the field shows that among the most credible and effective propagandists are the converted rebel returnees themselves.

The security team is composed of one (1) tactical squad with a squad leader, assistant squad leader and squad members. The security team is responsible in supporting the psyops team on security and other preparations. An additional squad may be attached to take care of guarding the perimeter and/or securing the POWs.

The stay-behind team, on the other hand, is a team trained similar to the psyops team but concentrates its efforts on village defense, organization and maintenance of the "BANTAY BAYAN", intelligence collection, and social investigation in preparation for the development effort.

Phase II - Intelligence

Intelligence plays a major role in SOT operations. It is a must that the SOT should conduct a thorough social investigation in its target area of operation to familiarize itself with the enemy situation (enemy strength, disposition, leadership, political structure in the barangays and personalities involved, potential intelligence assets in the barangay, etc.), the socio-economic and agro-industrial profile in the area, the population profile, the weather and the terrain.

Phase III - Psychological Operations

The psyops phase involves coordination of the SOT with tactical and friendly forces in the AOR; tasking of PA, PC/INP (the book was written a while back ) and other units; coordination with and involvement of local officials in the SOT psyops activities; barangay immersion of the SOT and the conduct of offensive dialogues in the target barangay to expose the personalities manning the enemy barangay political structures (i.e., Barrio Revolutionary Committees, party branch, local militia, peasant association, women association, youth association, etc.) Public exposure of such individuals in the barangay in effect uproots the enemy barangay political structure.

Phase IV - Neutralization

The neutralization phase involves the proper handling by the SOT of the surrenderees/returnees that may be coming in as a result of SOT activities in Phase III. This includes proper recording, photographing and interrogation of surrenderees/returnees. The latter are then requested to participate in a 3-day live-in seminar for purposes of reorientation, spiritual guidance, and renewal.

Phase V - Mobilization of the Populace

After neutralization of the enemy political structures in the barangay, the SOT's next task is to mobilize the local government officials and the populace in forming the "Bantay Bayan", an organization patterned after the CPP/NPA's barrio revolutionary committee. The chief tasks of the "Bantay Bayan" are intelligence and providing security for the barrio.

Phase VI - Village Defense Program

This phase involves the setting into place of a village defense program patterned after the security system of the "Kibbutz" in Israel whereby all of the populace are committed to defend its own village. At the moment, the village defense program is in the process of conceptualization and refinement.

Phase VII - Economic Development

The final phase is economic development. However, this task already beyond the purview of the SOT. It will not be the task of the local government officials and the various agencies of the government that will shoulder the task of bringing basic services to the people and uprooting the basic causes of dissidence and discontent.

[Adroth]

2 communist terrorists yield in Quezon

http://www.army.mil.ph/press_release/Oct/01_050_17102007.htm

Two communist terrorists voluntarily surrendered to members of the Army's Special Operations Team (SOT) under 74th Infantry Battalion at Sitio Centro, Brgy. Bosigon, Tagkawayan, Quezon at 9:30 a.m. on October 15.

The NPA surrenderors were identified as Efren Safe alias Ronald, 39 years old, married, Kilihim ng Ekonomiya/Pinansyal, Sangay ng Partido sa Lokalidad codename Apitong and Julio Aleleg y Bobis alias Ramina, 28, single and a member of Grupo ng Kabataan codename Narra, both under the Komiteng Larangan Gerilya (KLG) 41 of Komiteng Probinsya (KOMPROB) Quezon operating in the said province. The duo surrendered while the operating troops led by Sgt. Moral were conducting barangay immersion in the area. Said personalities are now under the custody of 74IB for custodial debriefing.

In Mountain Province, joint intelligence personnel of 5th Infantry Division and PNP of the said province while conducting special operations at Sitio Chapiosen, Brgy. Caneo, Bontoc recovered one M16 rifle, two long magazines and 30 rounds of ammunition for M16 and 90 pieces of trioxane ration.

The recovered items which were reportedly owned by the NPA's Komiteng Larangan Gerilya codename Marco are presently under the custody of the operating troops for safekeeping.

Meanwhile, in Cagayan province a section of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 17th Infantry Battalion led by Maj. Rodrigo Egipto and DENR personnel headed by Forester Elpidio Lactao recovered an estimated 4,000 board feet of illegally cut logs at Km. 15, Sitio Daligdig, Brgy. Sta. Margarita, Baggao on October 15 at 6:30 a.m.

The said logs which were found abandoned and were turned-over to DENR Baybayog, Alcala for proper disposition. Lt. Gen. Alexander B. Yano, the Army Chief congratulated the troops for their successive tactical accomplishments and encouraged them to remain focused and committed to the Army's mission.

"Let us continue our partnership with other sectors of the society in order for us to attain our vision of a peaceful and economically progressive country", Lt. Gen. Yano said.

[Adroth]

2 soldiers wounded in Calatrava ambush

http://www.visayandailystar.com/2007/October/23/police.htm

Two soldiers were injured in an ambush yesterday by about 40 suspected New People's Army rebels in Sitio Lagoc, Brgy. Laga-an, Calatrava, Negros Occidental, the military said.

Injured were PFC Anacleto Jabonite of the 33 rd Division Reconnaissance Company and Cpl. Mamerto Alimoren of the 15 th Infantry Battalion. Maj. Nathaniel Villasor, 303 rd Infantry Brigade Civil Military Operations Officer, said Jabonite and Alimoren are part of the Special Operations Team of the Philippine Army, and were on their way to Brgy. Menchaca, Calatrava, for SOT operations.

Despite being outnumbered, the Army's SOT operators sustained the gunbattle for more than an hour, prompting the rebel ambushers to withdraw in separate directions, Villasor said.

The injured soldiers were given initial medical treatment at the San Carlos City District Hospital, and will be transferred today to a private hospital in Bacolod City.

Twelve SOT teams were deployed by the 303 rd Infantry Brigade in the 12 hinterland barangays of Calatrava,
Toboso and Escalante, to counter the organizing and expansion activities of the NPA.

Villasor said SOT operators immersed themselves with the populace for several months through dialogs and by listing their concerns and problems, which are being exploited by the CPP-NPA legal fronts, to bring them to the attention of concerned local government units and concerned agencies.

Before the ambush, the military had reported frequent sightings of large formations of rebels in the upland areas of Calatrava and neighboring areas.

Villasor said pursuit operations were still ongoing last night on the fleeing rebels and were backed up by two Air Force helicopter gunships from Mactan Air Base in Cebu.*GPB

[shadowars]

these are the guys who do real frontline 'field work', exposing their safety and identity to the enemy, much tougher than APC armor.   

the whole program is functional and very doable and as what Sir A have posted, its gaining success.

there's just one phase that could undermine the whole program.Phase VII-  the concerned gov't agency ,local or national otherwise, should increase funding on this phase of the program. this could decide the over all success or lets hope not- failure of the SOT program and the efforts of these guys.

although it was stated in Phase VII that:

Phase VII - Economic Development

"The final phase is economic development. However, this task already beyond the purview of the SOT. It will  be the task of the local government officials and the various agencies of the government that will shoulder the task of bringing basic services to the people and uprooting the basic causes of dissidence and discontent. "

Just a question and suggestion,

Is there any allocation from the AFP some budget from the  modernization programs for at least basic road concreting of this rural areas and building of potable water supplies for places who dont have one?..IMO, the Army Enginneers , if given the task and the funding and the equipments ,can work faster than the DPWH..and the local congressmen in these areas..

The thought of corruption, well its everywhere. wala din naman nagawa ang LGU at DPWH, lets try our AFP Engineers do the job.

[Adroth]

there's just one phase that could undermine the whole program.Phase VII-  the concerned gov't agency ,local or national otherwise, should increase funding on this phase of the program. this could decide the over all success or lets hope not- failure of the SOT program and the efforts of these guys.

although it was stated in Phase VII that:

Phase VII - Economic Development

"The final phase is economic development. However, this task already beyond the purview of the SOT. It will  be the task of the local government officials and the various agencies of the government that will shoulder the task of bringing basic services to the people and uprooting the basic causes of dissidence and discontent. "

Just a question and suggestion,

Is there any allocation from the AFP some budget from the  modernization programs for at least basic road concreting of this rural areas and building of potable water supplies for places who dont have one?..IMO, the Army Enginneers , if given the task and the funding and the equipments ,can work faster than the DPWH..and the local congressmen in these areas..

The thought of corruption, well its everywhere. wala din naman nagawa ang LGU at DPWH, lets try our AFP Engineers do the job.

This is actually where Satur Ocampo himself said the original OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG failed. The AFP did its job, but the civilian government failed to delivery on Phase VII.

This phase is really beyond the control of the AFP. The AFP cannot win the COIN war alone. It can't do all of the government's job.

[specter]

Is there any allocation from the AFP some budget from the  modernization programs for at least basic road concreting of this rural areas and building of potable water supplies for places who dont have one?..IMO, the Army Enginneers , if given the task and the funding and the equipments ,can work faster than the DPWH..and the local congressmen in these areas..

The thought of corruption, well its everywhere. wala din naman nagawa ang LGU at DPWH, lets try our AFP Engineers do the job.

The AFP has no budget for the items you mentioned. However, there is the ongoing Kalayaan Barangays Project wherein the AFP engineers construct infrastructure such as farm to market roads, schoolbuildings etc. The funds for these projects are pooled from the concerned agencies (e.g. DPWH=roads, DepEd=schools). The rationale is for the AFP to sustain the momentum after clearing areas of insurgents (no broken promises to the people). I must emphasize however that the KBP is for conflict affected barangays only where civilian agencies are having a hard time entering.

=================================
P.S.

Last September, the AFP also created the National Development Support Command to take charge of developmental efforts.

[shadowars]

The AFP has no budget for the items you mentioned. However, there is the ongoing Kalayaan Barangays Project wherein the AFP engineers construct infrastructure such as farm to market roads, schoolbuildings etc. The funds for these projects are pooled from the concerned agencies (e.g. DPWH=roads, DepEd=schools). The rationale is for the AFP to sustain the momentum after clearing areas of insurgents (no broken promises to the people). I must emphasize however that the KBP is for conflict affected barangays only where civilian agencies are having a hard time entering.

=================================
P.S.

Last September, the AFP also created the National Development Support Command to take charge of developmental efforts.

This is good news. Good luck to the NDSC. this is what we need for a finisher. more power and more fundings! hopefully. 

[Adroth]

Does the PMC have their own SOTs, or is this an exclusively Army practice?

[hawkhunter]

from what i know, sir, we also have SOTs.

currently, the PMC is mustering Marine reservists to undergo SOT Orientaion Course.

we're still waiting kung kelan ang start ng training.

[Adroth]

from what i know, sir, we also have SOTs.

currently, the PMC is mustering Marine reservists to undergo SOT Orientaion Course.

we're still waiting kung kelan ang start ng training.

Thanks for responding Mr H. 

Without violating OPSEC, could you share what they had in mind for the reservists?

[hawkhunter]

i just wish i could answer question, that but right now we don't know what they have in-store for us. 



i'll keep you updated. 

[Adroth]

Looking forward to it. 

[SARKid]

The PA in Mindanao is regularly conducting SOTs to enemy influenced Baranggays.Most of the time,an engagement occurs because the rebels would try to "defend" their influenced Brgy and make a show of force...the result is the same,a rout.After an SOT team clears a Brgy,recruitment and training of CAFGUs are undertaken and a patrol base is established.Contractors can then develop infrastructure projects unhampered by harassment & revo taxes...the politicos get their cut of the contract...Hehehe

[ronin]

It looks like the primary task of the SOTs are similar with the A-teams of Special Forces.

In another thread, I remember reading that the Special Forces-Airborne want more direct action tasks. Do these two developments suggest a cross-over of sorts; that 'hearts-and-minds' programs are starting to be integrated into regular Army units vis-a-vis giving more direct action (commando type?) tasks for the SF?

[shrapnel]

I just noticed that the mission of the SOT is very classic Green Beret doctrine.  It's just ironic that they had to create an SOT concept when we theoretically already have an organization in place (our own Green Berets) that is supposed to be able to do the same mission.  I guess it's the Holywood influence that if you're "special forces" you have to be shooting someone or blowing things up.

In any case, it's still good in the sense that a greater ratio of our regular soldiers become "special operations capable" though not in the direct action sense.  Maybe the Army is better off just merging the Special Forces and Scout Rangers since they're being used for direct action anyway, and leave the "hearts and minds" missions to the SOTs.